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<title>Constitutional Law and Philosophy &#8211; Issues in Contemporary Constitutional Law, with a Special Focus on India and Kenya</title>
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									<h1 class="site-title"><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/" rel="home">Constitutional Law and Philosophy</a></h1>
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<article id="post-13443" class="post-13443 post type-post status-publish format-standard hentry category-article-21-and-the-right-to-life category-comparative-constitutional-law category-evictions category-right-to-housing category-south-africa tag-evictions tag-housing tag-south-africa">
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		<h1 class="entry-title"><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/14/guest-post-spatial-justice-in-eviction-cases-under-the-south-african-constitution/" rel="bookmark">Guest Post: Spatial Justice in Eviction Cases under the South African&nbsp;Constitution</a></h1>					<div class="entry-meta small-part">
				<span class="posted-on"><i class="fa fa-clock-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/14/guest-post-spatial-justice-in-eviction-cases-under-the-south-african-constitution/" rel="bookmark"><time class="entry-date published updated" datetime="2025-03-14T07:50:12+00:00">March 14, 2025</time></a></span><span class="byline"> <i class="fa fa-user space-left-right"></i><span class="author vcard"><a class="url fn n" href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/author/gautambhatia1988/">Gautam Bhatia</a></span></span><span class="comments-link"><i class="fa fa-comments-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/14/guest-post-spatial-justice-in-eviction-cases-under-the-south-african-constitution/#respond">Leave a comment</a></span>			</div><!-- .entry-meta -->
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<p>[This is a guest post by <strong>Rishika Sahgal</strong>.]</p>

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Cases involving eviction from well-located land in the heart of cities and relocation to urban peripheries are common across the world, including in India and South Africa. Resistance to such evictions involve intertwined demands to housing as well as to spatial justice, that is, the demand for well-located housing. A recent case – <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2024/27.html">Commando v City of Cape Town</a> (Commando) – decided by the South African Constitutional Court recognises the spatial dimension of these claims in the city of Cape Town. The case can serve as an important deliberative resource for Indian lawyers, judges and activists in framing and adjudicating such claims.

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><strong>Key issue: location, location, location</strong></p>

The case involved a group of 15 people and their families (I will call them residents) who were facing evictions in Cape Town. They were lawful tenants who had been living at the location for generations under lease agreements with private property owners. They were also one of the very few black communities who had successfully resisted displacement from inner city Cape Town during the apartheid era. More recently, private developers had bought these properties from the former owners with a view to redevelop the area. The local authority in Cape Town (I will call this “the City”) was in favour of ‘gentrification’ of the inner city and had created considerable tax incentives to promote redevelopment. After buying these properties, private developers cancelled lease agreements with residents, gave them notice to vacate their homes, and thereafter instituted eviction proceedings before the courts. These residents were impoverished, and if evicted, would not have been able to afford to rent another accommodation in the inner city. The City was willing to provide residents with temporary emergency accommodation so that the eviction did not render them homeless, as it is required to do under the South African Constitution (see <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html">Grootboom</a>, <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2011/33.html">Blue Moonlight</a>). However, this accommodation was 15 km away from their existing homes, outside the inner city of Cape Town. Their challenge was based on the location of the alternative accommodation offered to them.

The argument was nuanced. In the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2023/7.pdf">Supreme Court of Appeal</a>, judges had held that residents do not have a constitutional right to demand accommodation at a specific location. The residents urged the Constitutional Court to reframe the issue. They argued that the question to be decided is whether the state acted reasonably when implementing its emergency housing programme and particularly in determining the location of the accommodation offered under the programme. They argued that the City of Cape Town acted unreasonably when determining the location of the accommodation because it entirely excluded the possibility of temporary emergency accommodation in inner city Cape Town, which would have been more equivalent to the place from which they were being displaced. So, residents were not arguing that they had a right to demand accommodation at a specific location. Rather, they argued that the state has an obligation to act reasonably when determining the location of accommodation offered to residents (para 28). A blanket refusal to grant temporary emergency accommodation in the inner city, was unreasonable.

<p><strong>Relevant constitutional provisions and principles</strong></p>

The right to housing is explicitly enshrined under <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#26">section 26</a> of the South African Constitution. While s 26(1) guarantees the right, s 26(2) focuses on the obligations placed on the state to take reasonable measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the right. The case law has read these two sub-sections together, so the focus has been on evaluating the reasonableness of measures taken by the state in relation to housing under s 26(2),  without expanding on the content of the right under s 26(1) (for critical engagement with this, see work by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19962126.2003.11865170#:~:text=Despite%20recent%20pronouncements%20by%20the,Court%20has%20misconstrued%20this%20approach.">David Bilchitz</a>, and by <a href="https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.seri-sa.org%2Fimages%2Fstories%2FWilson_Dugard_Mar11.doc&amp;wdOrigin=BROWSELINK">Stuart Wilson and Jackie Dugard</a>). The residents in Commando framed their arguments within this approach, requiring the court to evaluate the reasonableness of state action with regards to the location of the accommodation offered to residents.

<p><strong>Backdrop: Spatial Apartheid</strong></p>

The context of displacement and dispossession of Africans from land under the apartheid South African regime formed an important backdrop to the case. Residents before the Constitutional Court highlighted this backdrop and argued that constitutional provisions on the right to housing must be interpreted with this in mind. They argued that the decision of the City of Cape Town to displace residents from the inner city and remove them to the peripheries of Cape Town would mirror the process undertaken by the erstwhile apartheid regime, entrenching spatial apartheid. The reasonableness of the state’s decision with regards to the location of accommodation offered to residents would therefore have to be considered against the constitutional requirement to undo the spatial apartheid legacy of the past [para 29].

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><strong>The decision of the Constitutional Court</strong></p>

The Constitutional Court was clear that the right to housing under s 26 does not include the right to temporary emergency accommodation to evictees at a particular location. At the same time, it recognised that the location of accommodation was of constitutional significance. The Court held that the state bore an obligation under s 26(2) to act reasonably, including in determining the location of temporary emergency accommodation. In determining what is reasonable, the court would scrutinise the state’s measures against relevant social, economic and historical context. Issues of spatial justice were an important component of this context. The Court unequivocally noted that &#8220;it is untenable for municipalities to conduct themselves in a manner that preserves spatial inequalities and reinforces patterns of social exclusion.&#8220;

<p class="has-text-align-justify">In determining what was reasonable within the circumstances, the state was also required to account for the impact of eviction on residents’ access to education, healthcare facilities, employment and community ties (<strong>para 101</strong>).</p>

Resource allocation was another important issue raised in the case. The City argued before the Constitutional Court that providing temporary emergency accommodation to residents in the inner city was too expensive, and that it had discretion with regards to how to allocate its limited budget. It had chosen to use its budget to prioritise provision of long-term social housing in the inner city instead of providing temporary emergency accommodation. The Constitutional Court was cognisant of separation of power concerns with regards to scrutinising budgetary or resource allocation decisions of the state. Yet, such concerns could not entirely exclude judicial scrutiny.

The approach of the Constitutional Court was to require the state to provide reasons for its actions. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/9320/chapter-abstract/156080958?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Sandra Fredman</a> has argued that such an approach helps to fulfil an important judicial role in upholding deliberative democracy rather than impeding on the democratically elected organs of the state. So, the judiciary was not telling the City how to spend its budget, because it recognised that such a decision was the proper role of the local authority. However, it could ask the City to provide reasons for its decisions, to ensure that all relevant constitutional issues were considered, and that the City’s claims were not unsubstantiated assertions but backed by cogent evidence [para 110]. <ins>It did so in two ways.</ins>

<ins>First</ins>, the Constitutional Court found that the City had not considered providing any temporary emergency accommodation to residents in the inner city, despite the serious impact of such a decision on spatial justice and other interconnected rights of the residents. Residents had indicated to the City that there was vacant state-owned land available in the inner city. The City argued that it planned to use this land to provide long-term social housing and not temporary emergency accommodation. This disadvantaged these residents, because they were too poor to meet the income requirements to qualify for social housing and so would be forced out of the area they had lived in for generations. The City had failed to consider the ‘actual situation’ of these residents when making its ‘blanket’ decision to refuse any temporary emergency accommodation in the inner city.

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><ins>Second, t</ins>he City argued that providing temporary emergency accommodation in the inner city was too expensive, but The Court found that this was a ‘vague’ and ‘unconvincing’ argument, because, &#8220;<em>there was no real attempt on the part of the City to place before the Court detailed information and data that would be essential for the purposes of an assessment of the reasonableness of its measures.</em>&#8221; (<strong>para 106</strong>)</p>

Overall, the Constitutional Court found that the City had acted unconstitutionally. As a remedy, it inter alia halted the eviction of residents and ordered the City to provide temporary emergency accommodation to the residents in the inner city, ‘as near as possible’ to their homes (para 116).

It is important to note that in this case, the arguments were centred around the location of temporary emergency accommodation rather than alternative accommodation of a more permanent kind. This is because of the peculiarity of South African housing rights jurisprudence. Courts in South Africa have recognised the need to prevent people from being rendered homeless and have therefore required that the state put in place a programme to fulfil the temporary emergency housing needs of those who would become homeless when faced with evictions at the hands of public authorities (<a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html">Grootboom</a>) and private landowners (<a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2011/33.html">Blue Moonlight</a>). Courts have been reluctant to order the state to provide permanent accommodation to such residents because of a concern around ‘queue jumping’, that is, jumping ahead of others already in line awaiting permanent accommodation under the housing policy of the state (<a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.html">Grootboom</a>, para 81). Of course, an abiding concern in South Africa is that such ‘temporary’ and ‘emergency’ accommodation has housed residents for years, with no sight of a more permanent housing allocation. This approach has therefore been subject to much critique (for example, see <a href="https://www.seri-sa.org/images/Jumping_the_Queue_MainReport_Jul13.pdf">this report</a> by the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-01-15-the-dangerous-solution-of-emergency-temporary-accommodation/">this op-ed</a> by David Dickinson and Louise du Plessis).

<p><strong>Take-away for India</strong></p>

Since <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/709776/">Olga Tellis</a>, the issue of alternate accommodation for impoverished people has always come up in eviction cases. Moreover, the location of such accommodation has been of key importance. For example, when recognising shelter as a fundamental right in <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/709776/">Olga Tellis</a>, Chief Justice YV Chandrachud accepted the importance of the location of shelter for people in at least two ways. First, he recognised that people sought shelter in the city, because ‘[t]hey have no option but to flock to big cities like Bombay, which provide the means of bare subsistence’. Second, people sought shelter close to where they worked in the city – [t]hey only choose a pavement or a slum which is nearest to their place of work’. Thus, from its very inception as a fundamental right, location of housing has been a key issue in eviction cases.

Similarly, in a more recent case before the Bombay High Court where the present author and this blog’s editor served as amicus curae (Prakash Gangaram Jadhav v Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai WP 3869/2021) residents facing evictions from their informal settlement challenged the location of alternative accommodation offered to them. They argued that the proposed place of relocation, the village of Mahul, was ‘unhygienic, unsanitary and unsafe.’ A division bench of the Bombay High Court framed the issue to be determined as follows,

<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
…the fundamental question of whether a PAP [project affected person] can oppose a public utility project and continue to remain illicitly on a site required for that public utility until the demands of the PAP for a relocation to a destination of choice are met and whether that PAP can specify the destination location or the PAP package as it were. (order dated 2 November 2023, paragraph 6).
</blockquote>

We can see that the Bombay High Court in Prakash Gangaram Jadhav framed the issue in similar terms as the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2023/7.pdf">South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Commando</a> &#8211; about whether residents have the right to relocation at a location of their choice. The case law indicates, in both India and South Africa, that courts are reluctant to recognise that residents have a right to alternate accommodation at a location of their choice. Instead, we can now take inspiration from the way the issue was framed before the South African Constitutional Court. So, the issue to be determined is whether the state’s decision with regards to location of alternate accommodation is reasonable. <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2024/27.html">Commando</a> indicates the value of reframing the issue in these terms.

Moreover, as argued before the Bombay High Court, the state has an obligation to meaningfully engage with residents about the location of alternate accommodation. So, while residents cannot demand alternate accommodation at a particular location as a matter of right, they can certainly demand that the state act reasonably when determining the location of accommodation; and that the state meaningfully engage with residents to determine the location as part of this duty to ‘act reasonably’. A similar point was made by the concurring opinion in <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2024/27.html">Commando</a>, wherein two judges required the City of Cape Town to meaningfully engage with residents in determining the location of temporary emergency accommodation offered to them within the inner city (paragraph 205).

<p><strong>Conclusion</strong>&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-justify">Issues of housing and spatial justice are inextricably intertwined. Impoverished people care not only about getting access to a house, but also care about the location of the house, because the location of housing serves as an important link with fulfilling their other material and non-material needs – employment, education, healthcare, community ties, etc. The issue of location or spatial justice has always cropped up in eviction cases. Post <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2024/27.html"><em><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">Commando</mark></strong></em></a>, the global legal community, including the Indian legal fraternity, has access to an important decision that indicates the doctrinal means for fulfilling both the right to housing and the interlinked right to spatial justice.   </p>
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<article id="post-13436" class="post-13436 post type-post status-publish format-standard hentry category-delimitation category-delimitation-federalism category-federalism category-fiscal-federalism category-parliamentary-democracy category-the-legislature tag-delimitation tag-federalism tag-fiscal-federalism tag-politicla-equality">
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		<h1 class="entry-title"><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/10/thinking-through-delimitation-part-iv-solutions/" rel="bookmark">Thinking Through Delimitation Part IV:&nbsp;Solutions</a></h1>					<div class="entry-meta small-part">
				<span class="posted-on"><i class="fa fa-clock-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/10/thinking-through-delimitation-part-iv-solutions/" rel="bookmark"><time class="entry-date published updated" datetime="2025-03-10T01:36:26+00:00">March 10, 2025</time></a></span><span class="byline"> <i class="fa fa-user space-left-right"></i><span class="author vcard"><a class="url fn n" href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/author/devadasanv/">Vasudev Devadasan</a></span></span><span class="comments-link"><i class="fa fa-comments-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/10/thinking-through-delimitation-part-iv-solutions/#respond">Leave a comment</a></span>			</div><!-- .entry-meta -->
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Not conducting delimitation for almost half a century has resulted in significant malapportionment, with the votes of certain citizens counting more than others. As the second post in this series noted (<a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/01/14/thinking-through-delimitation-part-ii-design-history-of-the-lok-sabha/">here</a>), the Constitution always contemplated States gaining and losing seats in the Lok Sabha based on the population of States. This ensured that constituency sizes across the country, and consequently the value of each citizen&#8217;s vote in national elections was equal. Restoring this equilibrium is thus a Constitutional imperative to ensure the continued legitimacy of Indian democracy.

However, if delimitation of Lok Sabha constituencies were carried out today, it would substantially re-distribute political power amongst states and political parties. It would likely be politically fractious because the winners and losers of delimitation would <a href="https://theprint.in/opinion/delimitation-is-the-last-thing-india-needs-now-it-will-widen-the-north-south-divide/1618136/">fall along existing regional, linguistic, economic, and political cleavages</a>. Richer, older, mostly southern, non-Hindi, non-NDA states (see <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/03/indias-emerging-crisis-of-representation?lang=en">Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Kerala, West Bengal, and Karnataka) would lose seats in the Lok Sabha</a>, and likely view the exercise as a partisan power grab.

Moving past the political rhetoric utilised by parties to get voters to care about this issue, the States that stand to lose seats in a delimitation exercise raise genuine issues regarding the design and operation of India’s federalism. The Constitution assigns important functions and responsibilities to State Governments, which are closer to citizens than the Union ever will be. But today, the design of the Union Parliament and centralisation of governance does not take seriously the concerns of States as federal units. The Union Government exerts significant fiscal and policy influence over State subjects like education, health, and employment. Implicit in promises such as &#8216;double-engine sarkar’ is the notion that the Union Government’s support for States is both partisan and tied to a State’s electoral relevance for national political parties. As noted in the previous post (<a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/01/24/thinking-through-delimitation-part-iii-the-rajya-sabha-is-not-federal/">here</a>), The body intended to protect the interests of the States at the national level, the Rajya Sabha, has failed in both its design and operation to do so.

The result is that the States are constitutionally mandated and electorally accountable to provide governance on a range of local issues, but smaller States with limited Lok Sabha and cabinet representation are given decreasing control over their policies and finances. This is why States are deeply concerned with losing seats in the Lok Sabha and it is a legitimate issue that militates against simply carrying out delimitation without a package of federal reforms. These reforms will need to do some combination of: (1) decentralise powers and funding to the States making a loss of Parliamentary seats more palatable, and/or (2) give the States meaningful authorship over aspects of national policies and devolutions that impact their governance priorities.

<p><strong>Starting with the Lok Sabha</strong></p>

One proposed solution is to increase the size of the Lok Sabha so that no State loses seats, but that the more populous States gain additional seats to account for their increased population. <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/03/indias-emerging-crisis-of-representation?lang=en">Milan Vaishnav and Jamie Hinston</a> have modelled what this may look like. While in absolute terms, no State will lose seats through this proposal, the relative power of States with declining populations will be reduced in the same way as losing Seats. Another proposed solution is to <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/alok-prasanna-6378055_delimitation-india-constitution-activity-7303017344153329664-RONX?utm_source=share&amp;utm_medium=member_desktop&amp;rcm=ACoAABxeJZwBu81T6EaViAkL3BSWc3cToemwTJQ">only count voters, not people</a> in the States for delimitation. However, this idea does nothing for small States whose interests are already not being taken seriously and will ultimately lead to similar imbalances when the now under-18 population in northern states eventually become voters. It also creates incentives for States to register more voters and electoral rolls are less credible and stable than census figures. Thus, these ideas fail to provide constitutionally durable solutions to the States’ concerns.

However, the proposals do raise an important ancillary point. Ensuring no State lost seats would increase the size of the Lok Sabha from 545 to 848 and thus also lower constituency sizes. (Interestingly, the Lok Sabha chamber in the newly constructed Parliament has 888 seats.) The optimum size of a legislature is a hard question to solve because what constitutes a well-functioning legislature is itself disputed and results vary based on a host of social, economic, and institutional factors. As James Madison noted in Federalist 55, “No political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature.”

There is a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0176268022001203">trade-off between democratic representation and democratic effectiveness</a>. Smaller constituencies can make running for office more accessible and make elected officials more responsive, which may in turn boost voter turnout. Under the right circumstances, a larger legislature may be more heterogeneous and include more women and minorities. A more inclusive decision-making process should also in theory reduce factual mistakes and external costs on individuals. A larger legislature may also gently subvert the anti-defection law as party elites struggle to control larger flocks of legislators. It can also improve the Committee system by increasing the human resources available for the important task of Parliamentary accountability. However, a larger legislature also means increased cumulative spending on elections, more public spending on legislators, decreased legislative efficiency, and the risk of more pork-barrel policies.

The Constitution originally capped constituency sizes at 750,000. If we were to return to this model, the Lok Sabha today would consist of around 1,900 Members. Such a large number does raise concerns over legislative effectiveness. However, it must be acknowledged that a key cause for such concern is the centralised nature of Indian federalism. We are worried that a large Union Parliament would be ineffective because we are used to the Union Parliament doing so much. In a world where State Legislatures (which would still be smaller and more efficient) did most of the legislating, a larger, more legitimate, more representative Lok Sabha which focussed on truly national priorities (instead of the delivery of services) may not be all bad. This is another reason why Lok Sabha reform is ultimately tied to federal concerns.

<p><strong>Reforming the Rajya Sabha</strong></p>

The problem at the heart of delimitation is the centralisation of governance and the inability of States to advance their interests in Parliament (and consequently vis-à-vis the Union Government). Re-designing the Rajya Sabha (RS) to better allow States to secure their interests would be one way to give States more say over decisions that impact their governance priorities. RS reform can be examined from three different, but inter-related considerations: geographic distribution, the electoral system, and the powers and functions of the upper house.

As noted in the previous post, seats in the RS are currently largely allocated based on population. This means that the RS fails to distribute power any differently from the Lok Sabha. It fails to achieve a geographic distribution of power. Splitting up the States’ seats into zones, the geographic distribution of RS seats is currently as follows: North 30.9%, West 17.6%, Central 13.73%, East 12.88%, and South 24.89% (complete calculations <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Tsr3z1gtvnxXOcRWS8SuJ1hI6X11ayLl/edit?usp=sharing&amp;ouid=106791359412934299699&amp;rtpof=true&amp;sd=true">here</a>). This distribution, similar to that of the Lok Sabha, disproportionately favours the interests of northern and southern States and is part of the reason they have come to dominate national politics (income distribution being another key reason). Distributing power based on population also allows the Union Government to ignore or discriminate against smaller States with little political cost (the limited attention paid to central and eastern states, with Manipur being a recent egregious case, is an example of this structure).

One way to give smaller States more say in the RS would be to give all States equal representation in the RS (like the U.S. or Australian Senate). This would significantly improve the bargaining power of States. However, the risk is that a very small block of sparsely populated states could impede important legislation leading to minority rule. For example, if each State was given 5 seats in the RS, the 16 smallest states with a population of around 116 million (or 12% of the population) could bring Parliament to a halt. This risk is heightened by the fact that for historical reasons, States in India are geographically unevenly distributed. For example, the East has several small States which could form a disproportionately powerful voting block under a system of inter-state parity. (The geographic distribution under such a system would be: North 25.81%, West 12.90%, Central 12.90%, East 29.03%, and South 19.35%). Thus, there is a case to be made that inter-state parity is better suited to situations where there are few states (the Australian example) or where small and large states are geographically and politically dispersed (e.g., America’s two largest states of California and Texas are geographically and politically poles apart).

Another potential avenue would be degressive proportionality as applied by Germany and the European Union. This would allocate a minimum number of seats to all States and then give additional seats to States based on population with fewer additional seats for every increment in population. The Rajya Sabha already follows such an approach (1 MP per million till 5 million and an additional MP for every additional 2 million) but the current formula results in little deviation from allocation by population. An example of a more equalising formula would be to allocate every State 5 RS MPs and then subsequently allocate an additional MP based on population bands (e.g., +1 for States between 10m-30m, +2 for States between 30m-50m, +3 for States between 50m-75m, +4 for States between 75m-100m, and +5 States over 100m). This example would result in a geographic distribution of: North 26.17%, West 14.95%, Central 13.55%, East 23.83%, and South 24.89% &#8211; a halfway house between population-based and State-based distribution of seats.

However, this is only one example of a degressive proportionality formula and one which only uses population (hence balancing population and State distribution). States could choose to balance other factors such as median age in States, language, or the <a href="https://srajagopalan.substack.com/p/demography-delimitation-and-democracy%5d">State’s own revenue</a> in distributing seats. Further, strict adherence to a formula is not necessary. Indeed, the current formula for seat allocation is not codified in the Constitution, with the Fourth Schedule simply listing each States’ seats in the RS. Thus, the States could simply negotiate a degressively proportional allocation that balanced the considerations they deemed important and list the allocation in the Constitution. It should, however, (1) distribute power differently from the Lok Sabha across factors including geography; (2) avoid the risk of minority rule; (3) protect the interests of smaller States more than the current system; and (4) its adoption should be conditional on acceptance by a high super-majority of State Legislatures.

<p><strong>Changing how Rajya Sabha Members are Chosen</strong></p>

In addition to changing the State&#8217;s seat allocation in the RS, reforms could include changes to RS elections. It may be time to consider abolishing the 12 nominated seats in the RS. The anti-defection law means no matter how enlightened a nominated Member’s contributions, their impact on law-making is negligible. Further, long-standing concerns that nominations would become a <a href="https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2024/Feb/03/nominated-rajya-sabha-celebs-lose-relevance">tool for political patronage</a> and <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/with-six-nominated-members-nda-has-slender-majority-in-rajya-sabha/articleshow/113145246.cms?from=mdr">a government voting block</a> have come to fruition. Finally, the existence of nominated Members reduces the chamber’s democratic credentials and makes it harder to justify increasing the lawmaking powers of the RS, which is essential to give States a greater say.

Another potential change could be directly electing RS members. This would further enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Rajya Sabha and remove any justification for not giving the Rajya Sabha power over financial legislation. It would also curb the use of the Rajya Sabha as a tool for political patronage. Finally, it would create a real link (which does not exist now) between RS Members and the States they represent. While political parties may nominate out-of-State candidates for RS seats, voters are less likely to choose out-of-State candidates if direct elections are in place. This would represent a de-facto residency requirement, as opposed to the artificial legal domicile requirement that RS MPs regularly circumvented by <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/manmohan-singhs-2-bhk-house-in-guwahati-how-he-remained-a-diligent-tenant-7343577">renting property in the State</a>, and which <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/no-domicile-clause-for-rs-elections-sc/articleshow/1917385.cms">was finally removed in 2003</a>. Another potential solution would be to require that after a candidate contested an RS seat from one State, they were barred from contesting from any other State in the future, ensuring their fortunes were tied to the State they sought to represent.

The downside of direct elections to the RS is that it will likely return a different calibre of MP than the indirect process. Some of the nation’s most esteemed parliamentarians have only been elected due to the indirect elections by State legislatures. Further, the current system of indirect election follows proportional representation of State Legislatures in the RS, which ensures that the composition of the RS more accurately represents the composition of Legislatures across the country. Thus, any proposal for direct elections to the RS must be based on a system of proportional representation. This would be an excellent first step to introduce the powerful idea of proportional representation for direct elections in India which was abandoned at independence due to fears that ordinary citizens would not understand it. There is compelling precedent for a directly elected proportionality represented upper house in the form of the Australian Senate, <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Representative-Still-the-role-of-the-Senate-in-our-democracy.pdf">which has resisted party capture and ensured the rise of smaller parties</a> for several decades.

<p><strong>Powers of the Rajya Sabha</strong></p>

Giving States greater voting power in the RS is of limited significance if the upper house does not have power over Money Bills (the classification of non-financial legislation as Money Bills only exacerbates the problem). As noted in the previous post, the framers&#8217; reference to the House of Lords&#8217; lack of power over financial legislation is deeply misguided. There are cogent reasons to deny an unelected body with deep ties to the aristocracy and British Conservative Party power over the budget. But the Rajya Sabha was meant to represent the States, which are deeply impacted by the contents of Money Bills given India&#8217;s system of fiscal centralisation and inter-governmental transfers. This rationale is reflected by international experience, with second, federal chambers in the U.S., Australia, Brazil, and Germany all possessing meaningful power over budgetary legislation. Even without reforming the RS, there is a compelling case to give the RS power over Money Bills to empower the States.

A common concern with such proposals is that budgets could result in regular gridlock. One potential solution would be to split budgetary powers to allow the Lok Sabha exclusive power over core Union Government priorities (e.g., national defence, foreign affairs, and central agencies) and give the RS powers over all items that result in devolutions to the States or non-strategic spending in specific States. Both the German and Indonesian Constitutions follow a version of this approach that can provide guidance.

Two final important but tangential points are the Speakership and Article 3. As noted in the previous post, there is no structural reason for the Vice President (appointed by the Executive) should be the Speaker/Chairperson of the RS. Both an elected Speaker and a rotating Speaker amongst States should be investigated. Finally, RS reforms must also consider Article 3 of the Constitution which allows Parliament to unilaterally create new States. There is a real risk that giving States more power in the RS could increase existing pressures for the creation of new States. Taking away this power from Parliament and giving it to a high super-majority of State Legislatures would: (1) reduce the pressure on a national political party to create new States; (2) restrict Parliament from abusing its powers to create new States; and (3) allow for the creation of new States where there was a national consensus that it was warranted. Giving all existing States power over the creation of new States also makes sense where seat allocation is more equal amongst States because the voting power of existing States in the RS will be diluted by the creation of new States.

<p><strong>Rajya Sabha Reform and Fiscal Federalism </strong>&nbsp;</p>

This blog series has consistently underscored that States fear reduced Parliamentary representation because they believe it may lead to reduced fiscal devolutions. How does RS reform solve this problem? Giving the RS power over budgetary legislation gives States significant control over devolutions. However increasing the voting power of smaller States in the RS also gives these States increased bargaining power in all negotiations with the Union Government, which can no longer afford to ignore smaller States.

States’ power over finances is at the heart of not just federalism, but representative government. The power to elect a State Government is meaningless if the State Government has no control over spending. This is particularly true in India where <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2019-01/Report%20on%20CENTRAL%20TRANSFERS%20TO%20STATES%20IN%20INDIA.pdf">States collect around 37.5% of revenue but incur over 60% of public expenditure</a>. This is an inherent feature of large federations where Central Governments are well placed to collect certain taxes (e.g., income tax and customs duties) while local governments are best placed to provide public services such as education, policing, and local infrastructure. Therefore, inter-governmental transfers are an inevitable feature of such systems, where the Central Government collects certain taxes and distributes them to the States. However, this disconnect between the Government tasked with revenue raising and the Government tasked with spending leads to a host of issues including (1) the desire of the Union to dictate fiscal priorities and prudence; (2) the potential for partisan and regional discrimination; and (3) weaker incentives for the Union to raise revenue and the States to maintain fiscal discipline. An ideal system would grant States as much taxing power as possible till these issues were worth tolerating but this balance is beyond the scope of this post. There are however a few constitutional design questions worth examining.

Funding to States by the Union occurs through two broad channels, the Finance Commission and Union Ministries. Finance Commissions have historically acquitted themselves well vis-à-vis fiscal autonomy to the States. However, a glaring omission for some time has been the fact that States have no say in the appointment to the Commission. Article 280(2) empowers Parliament to pass laws regulating the selection of the Commission, and updating the Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1951 to give the States a say in Commission appointments would be an important safeguard to ensure the continuing neutrality and legitimacy of the Commission.

The second channel of transfers to the States is of greater concern. Transfers to specific States by Union Ministries have been used <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2019-01/Report%20on%20CENTRAL%20TRANSFERS%20TO%20STATES%20IN%20INDIA.pdf">by ruling parties to entice voters in those States</a>, nationalising State politics and making the Union a partisan actor in State financing. <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/42606/chapter-abstract/357548288?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Expanding conditional Union transfers on core State subjects</a> such as health and education also reduces the fiscal independence of States to spend money how they see fit based on the electoral coalitions that elected them. An evaluation of the Union’s 34 Centrally Sponsored Schemes found <a href="https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2023/04/Paper_on_CSS_Report__to_PMEAC_Final_Aug_2021.pdf">10 cover areas that are exclusively within the State List</a> of the Seventh Schedule. These transfers are also subject to backroom partisan bargain which obfuscates the chain of accountability for voters and significantly disadvantages smaller States with limited electoral relevance to national politics. Because these transfers are not based on a formula, they also <a href="https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/42606/chapter-abstract/357548288?redirectedFrom=fulltext">interfere with the ability of the Finance Commission to neutrally devolve funds</a>. Finally, Union transfers to States have been shown to <a href="https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2023/04/Paper_on_CSS_Report__to_PMEAC_Final_Aug_2021.pdf">exacerbate the gap between rich and poor States</a>, with the <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2019-01/Report%20on%20CENTRAL%20TRANSFERS%20TO%20STATES%20IN%20INDIA.pdf">greatest benefit to States coming from untied general use funds</a>.

These funds are typically transferred under Article 282, which was arguably intended to be a residuary and exceptional provision of fund transfers to the States. Giving the Rajya Sabha power over Money Bills can give States important ex-ante control over these funds as they could insist on greater transparency and consistency on devolutions in exchange for voting on budgets. Another bigger reform would be to create a GST Council-like body where all States are represented to oversee more regular transfers and integrate this with the operation of the Finance Commission.

<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>

The debate surrounding delimitation is often reduced to either mathematical hypotheticals or regional factionalism. Both these approaches fail to recognise the deep structural tensions raised by the delimitation problem which trace themselves to the design, history, and working of the Constitution. The last three posts have been an effort to unearth these tensions to demonstrate that there are no quick fixes.

<p class="has-text-align-justify">This post has focussed on solutions. Many of the ideas discussed are big and if seriously considered could require years of work before they can be operationalised. But I would argue that this is the scale we should be thinking at. The tensions raised by delimitation go to the very roots of our constitutional design and the current moment represents an opportunity to re-imagine the relationship between the Union and the States without the spectre of balkanisation that dominated the framing (as the design of the Rajya Sabha exemplifies). We should also not be sucked into an artificial time constraint. Delimitation has been delayed by decades, and we would be better off pushing it a few more years providing we are taking meaningful steps to craft real and durable solutions. Thus, the goal should not be to ‘solve the  delimitation problem’ and just get delimitation done but rather leverage this moment to craft a more perfect Union of States.</p>
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<article id="post-13428" class="post-13428 post type-post status-publish format-standard hentry category-arrest category-criminal-law-and-the-constitution category-criminal-procedure category-personal-liberty tag-criminal-law-and-the-constitution-2 tag-enforcement-directorate tag-pmla">
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		<h1 class="entry-title"><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/08/guest-post-coercive-powers-in-tax-matters-the-judgment-in-radhika-agarwal-v-uoi/" rel="bookmark">Guest Post: Coercive Powers in Tax Matters &#8211; The Judgment in Radhika Agarwal v&nbsp;UOI</a></h1>					<div class="entry-meta small-part">
				<span class="posted-on"><i class="fa fa-clock-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/08/guest-post-coercive-powers-in-tax-matters-the-judgment-in-radhika-agarwal-v-uoi/" rel="bookmark"><time class="entry-date published updated" datetime="2025-03-08T14:21:38+00:00">March 8, 2025</time></a></span><span class="byline"> <i class="fa fa-user space-left-right"></i><span class="author vcard"><a class="url fn n" href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/author/gautambhatia1988/">Gautam Bhatia</a></span></span><span class="comments-link"><i class="fa fa-comments-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/08/guest-post-coercive-powers-in-tax-matters-the-judgment-in-radhika-agarwal-v-uoi/#respond">Leave a comment</a></span>			</div><!-- .entry-meta -->
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<p>[This is a guest post by <strong>Abhinav Sekhri</strong>, cross-posted with permission from <em><a href="https://theproofofguilt.blogspot.com/2025/02/coercive-powers-in-tax-matters-judgment.html"><strong><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">The Proof of Guilt</mark></strong></a> </em>blog.]</p>

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On 27.02.2025, a Three Justices&#8217; Bench of the Supreme Court delivered its verdict in a large batch of petitions which raised issues about the manner and exercise of the power of arrest without warrant under the Customs Act 1962 and the Central and State GST Acts. The judgment, reported as <a href="https://www.sci.gov.in/view-pdf/?diary_no=466162018&amp;type=j&amp;order_date=2025-02-27&amp;from=latest_judgements_order" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India &amp; Ors.</a> [2025 INSC 272 (&#8216;Radhika Agarwal&#8216;)], consists of two opinions — one penned by the CJI for himself and Justice Sundresh, and a separate, mostly concurring, opinion by Justice Trivedi for herself.

This post will engage mainly with the majority opinion and its two main themes: (i) applying the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Cr.P.C.] to warrantless arrests made under the Customs Act and GST Acts, and (ii) regulating exercise of warrantless arrests under both these acts. There are some smaller issues / aspects, which I take up under a &#8216;Miscellany&#8217; head. The post then turns to the separate opinion of Trivedi J. where I try and explain its synergy, and dissonance, with the majority opinion. A small concluding section ends the post.

Extending the Cr.P.C. to Warrantless Arrests under Revenue Laws

Radhika Agarwal&nbsp;unambiguously extends Cr.P.C. provisions regulating warrantless arrests by police to the exercise of such powers under the Customs Act / GST Acts by revenue officials. This means that officers conducting arrests must wear clear badges, must inform relatives about arrest, maintain diaries to note progress of investigation, furnish grounds of arrest in writing to an accused prior to them being taken before a magistrate for further custody, and allow the arrested person to meet with legal counsel during interrogation (though not for its entirety) [Paras 23-28].&nbsp;

One may reasonably argue that this extension is hardly a perceptible shift, as practically all of the above requirements were already being adopted by the relevant departments. The argument about extending the Cr.P.C. regime to arrests under the Customs Act / GST Acts regime was not to make sure that officers wear name tags while arresting persons — nobody goes to Court for that. The gain&nbsp;for petitioners and accused persons here was to&nbsp;firstly&nbsp;get clarity on whether Section 41-A Cr.P.C. applies to arrests under the Customs Act / GST Acts, and&nbsp;secondly&nbsp;get a ruling that officers conducting arrests under the special laws are police officers, which in turn would impact the evidentiary value of any statements recorded by them. On both these aspects,&nbsp;Radhika Agarwal&nbsp;rules in favour of the Union on my reading — slightly ambiguously in respect of the Section 41-A issue, and very resoundingly on the &#8216;police officer&#8217; issue.&nbsp;

Section 41-A Cr.P.C. pertains to issuing notices to join an investigation. It has been used by the Supreme Court to foster a regime where today, for offences up to seven years, ordinarily such notices are sent to secure the cooperation of accused persons as opposed to rushing for an arrest. Extending it to the Customs Act / GST Acts regime would, in turn, help in staving arrests as most offences under these special laws are punishable up to seven years. Interestingly, the majority opinion in&nbsp;Radhika Agarwal&nbsp;is entirely silent on whether Section 41-A Cr.P.C. applies to the Customs Act / GST Acts regime on arrests. What to make of this? Technically, since Section 41-A is&nbsp;pre arrest&nbsp;and the judgment is concerned with&nbsp;post arrest&nbsp;issues, one may argue that the issue is left open. At the same time, nothing stopped the Court from looking at the clause, especially since the judgment refers to neighbouring Sections 41-B and 41-D of the Cr.P.C. It is fair to say that this issue may yet be litigated further.&nbsp;

Moving on, Radhika Agarwal decisively rejects the contention that officers arresting persons under the Customs Act / GST Acts regime are &#8216;police officers&#8217;. It does not on the strength of its own reasoning, but by relying purely on precedent which recognised this distinction. This precedent has been extensively discussed elsewhere on [The Proof of Guilt] blog <a href="https://theproofofguilt.blogspot.com/search?q=badku" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>, and in a paper <a href="https://nujslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Abhinav-Sekhri.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>, with my view being that the distinction needs to be revisited. That the Court chose not to do so is a win for the government, since treating such officers as &#8216;police officers&#8217; would have dealt a bodyblow to the evidentiary value of statements recorded by them during the course of an inquiry or investigation.

Nevertheless, reading Radhika Agarwal I wonder just how long this artificial distinction between officers will continue to hold the field, at least when a person is arrested. Since the 1960s, which is when the Constitution Bench decisions creating this artificial distinction came, the law has not remained static. A big change has been the shift in judicial perspective. The older cases took a formalist and hyper-technical approach to the issue to play a game of spot the difference where if even one facet from the Cr.P.C. regime on investigations was absent from the special law, that meant the officers under special laws were not seen as police officers for any purpose [Editor&#8217;s Note: This issue is discussed in detail in the &#8216;Rights&#8217; chapter of the blog editor&#8217;s <a href="https://www.amazon.in/Indian-Constitution-Conversations-Power/dp/9365693756/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.iaYKuWm13GWdz7ylrxIAyyLtB72vuZ0pxf3EhDuLNZOtRCroJyv2OkyyI7MA3DPb58QyzNGLAcxELnV4x71c0L2bLm4h3X8Q-qRAn9ANFMarpqvUBuiNMvTJcU58R2BHIlFjmHQjFHwu908DwoLjaLysKBZZzmoYu4xQDC895kx9VTG-DbkDYNwzjdCsBPI9xdzw3As8KuxO0xad1kBZzSBnoAjx3zC1PuFKSOk8TAE.4iT-ne5pLznStJXRJ-LPu9XVt4hqMzM3GHkj5JjZ9dU&amp;qid=1738911977&amp;sr=8-2">The Indian Constitution: A Conversation with Power</a>.] Over time, this formalist approach gave way to a judicial perspective focusing on the impact of coercive action on life and liberty, especially when it comes to arrests. Radhika Agarwal also adopts this approach and uses it to further bridge the gap between arrests by ordinary police officers and revenue officers by extending the Cr.P.C. explicitly to the latter.

Warrantless arrests are a serious infringement with personal liberty. The gravity of this infringement does not alter on the basis of the department in question. Nor is there any difference in the consequential impact of arrests. If the evidentiary value of statements by arrested persons to regular police officers is deemed sketchy, nothing inherently changes the reliability of such statements by arrested persons when they are made to revenue officers. One hopes, therefore, that at least in the context of arrested persons, a bench of the Supreme Court will soon have the courage to simply apply the <a href="http://logger.com/blog/posts/6959663745656332605" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Duck Test</a>, and treat all officers with the power of arrest without warrant as belonging to one category.

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><strong>Regulating the Exercise of Arrest Powers</strong></p>

Unsurprisingly, the majority opinion in Radhika Agarwal extends the judicial approach recently taken by the CJI in <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58570551/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Arvind Kejriwal</a> [(2025) 2 SCC 248] which sought to regulate warrantless arrest powers under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 [&#8216;PMLA&#8217;]. The PMLA arrest provision is quite similar to the Customs Act / GST Acts clause, allowing for easy transplantation. Essentially, this approach consists of two conjoint parts. First, an insistence upon rigid compliance with the statutory tests for warrantless arrests, and second, recognising that the exercise of this arrest power is amenable to judicial review.

The statutory test for warrantless arrest under the Customs Act / GST Acts has been reduced to a threefold exercise for ease of understanding: (i) the officer must have material in his possession, (ii) this material must be the basis to form &#8216;reasons to believe&#8217; which are recorded in writing, that (iii) the person is guilty of having committed the alleged offence. Following&nbsp;Arvind Kejriwal,&nbsp;each of these three parts is developed by the Court in a way to ensure that the arresting power is not arbitrarily used. Thus, the &#8216;material&#8217; must be translatable into legally admissible evidence and consist of&nbsp;all&nbsp;the material available and not deliberately exclude material that favours the accused. The &#8216;reasons to believe&#8217; recorded in writing must be lucid and clear, and must be shared with persons. Lastly, the legislative mandate in requiring for reasons to believe a person is &#8216;guilty&#8217; of the alleged offence suggests a higher threshold as compared to arrests governed by the Cr.P.C. provisions which prescribe a lighter test in the form of requiring only a reasonable suspicion (more on this later).&nbsp;

A little more time must be spent on the recording reasons part of the exercise here. The warrantless arrest power under the Customs Act / GST Acts regime is not recognised for all crimes. Instead, it triggers only if a certain monetary threshold is crossed (in most cases). For instance, only if the alleged tax intentionally evaded by the accused is beyond 5 Crores does the warrantless arrest power come alive under the GST Act. What Radhika Agarwal clarifies is that the recording of reasons must also explain on what basis has an officer decided that the monetary threshold was crossed. While this is undoubtedly a significant move, the Supreme Court does not go quite as far as the Delhi High Court had back in <a href="https://indiankanoon.org/doc/183692293/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">2016</a>, when in context of service tax laws it had restricted the warrantless arrest power as contingent upon a tax assessment order being passed quantifying the tax demand as crossing the monetary limit.

Significant also is the fact that the majority opinion deals with a contention that the threat of arrest was being used to coerce persons into paying tax dues. Obviously, the Court holds that arrest powers cannot be used to coerce persons into paying up, but it takes the issue a step further to hold that aggrieved persons can take their pleas to court and, if found true, then they would be entitled to refund of any dues so coercively paid. Whether this remedy is a meaningful one or not is difficult to say, considering judicial delays and the difficulty to establish coercion.

Which brings us to the second part of the regulatory exercise — judicial review of arrests. The existence of having statutory tests regulating the exercise of arrests is meaningless without the possibility of judicial review, and one reason for the Court to insist upon strict and&nbsp;documented&nbsp;compliance with statutory tests for arrest is to ensure fairer exercise of judicial review. At the same time, the majority opinion itself notes, in line with&nbsp;Arvind Kejriwal, that the review here is not a &#8216;merits&#8217; review by, for instance, testing whether the material itself was correct or not. Rather, it is akin to judicial review of administrative action, allowing courts to step in if the action is, for instance, found to be entirely unreasonable, perverse, arbitrary, or is an action based on jurisdictional error. The import of proportionality analysis will aid this exercise. Though it must be flagged that a key issue within a proportionality assessment of whether the&nbsp;necessity&nbsp;of an arrest can be reviewed was referred to a larger bench in&nbsp;Arvind Kejriwal&nbsp;and remains pending.

I will return to the theme of judicial review when dealing with the separate opinion. Before that, a slight detour to cover some miscellaneous findings of interest.&nbsp;

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><strong>Miscellaneous Findings</strong></p>

There are some other notable points in the majority opinion, out of which I would want to flag two given their connection with the [Proof of Guilt] blog. First, the opinion has again remained faithful to precedent where it notes that persons who have received a notice to cooperate with the inquiry etc. under the revenue laws are not persons &#8216;accused of an offence&#8217; for purposes of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Second, the opinion notes that even though such persons may not be falling within the scope of Article 20(3), they can still avail of their remedies to seek anticipatory bail, where they can demonstrate that a threat of arrest exists. In doing so, the Court overrules the contrary view taken by some benches last year, which was also criticised on the [Proof of Guilt] blog <a href="https://theproofofguilt.blogspot.com/search?q=choodamani" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><strong>The Separate Opinion</strong></p>

Justice Trivedi&#8217;s short separate opinion is restricted only to expressing her views on the manner in which judicial review of the exercise of arrest powers ought to be conducted. Is it a concurrence, or a dissent, or yet another one of those separate opinions which is a bit of both? While on first blush it appeared that the third category is the safest bet, on a re-reading of her opinion I do believe that it is a concurrence which is merely emphasising the note of caution which is inherent in the majority opinion itself. At the same time, I also sense a divergence of views on a more fundamental aspect of what is the purpose of arrests in context of revenue laws.&nbsp;

Justice Trivedi recognises the power of writ review in context of warrantless arrests, but urges that courts should ordinarily be &#8216;loath&#8217; to interfere with use of the power by the concerned authorities under laws that concern serious financial crimes. Thus, while she agrees that non-compliance with the statute would be a valid ground for review, she cautions that this should not prompt courts to use a &#8216;magnifying glass&#8217; to blow up minor procedural lapses on part of officers and confer undue benefits upon accused persons.

This, according to me, is just a more cautious way of expressing the same idea as the majority: do not go for a merits review, and do not interfere unless the decision is found perverse or arbitrary. Minor technical violations would not pass muster even under the&nbsp;Arvind Kejriwal&nbsp;standard, which Justice Trivedi does not disagree from specifically within her opinion.&nbsp;

I would submit that a large part of Justice Trivedi&#8217;s concerns, and the seeming differences in her view from the majority, stem from deeper differences in how the two opinions viewed the&nbsp;use&nbsp;of the arrest power. For the separate opinion there is a tight nexus between arrest and investigation, requiring a wider berth to be granted to agencies. Thus, one finds that Justice Trivedi urges caution while reviewing arrests because the investigation may be at a &#8216;very nascent&#8217; stage. Whereas for the majority opinion, a legislative mandate that allows warrantless arrest only upon gathering material sufficient to form reasons to believe that a person is guilty of the offence&nbsp;assumes&nbsp;that an investigation has progressed to a degree. In fact, the majority opinion at one place in its discussion on the GST regime specifically notes that the arrest &#8220;cannot be made to merely investigate whether the conditions are being met.&#8221; Thus, the arrest power in these revenue laws is not&nbsp;primarily&nbsp;used as an investigate tool, but a step later on in the inquiry and adjudicatory process.&nbsp;

In this regard, while I understand the perspective of Justice Trivedi, it is understandable why the majority opinion does not begin from that standpoint. In rare cases, arrests in revenue laws may occur at a nascent stage and there the usual caveats may apply, but that is not the norm. After all, it is because arrests are not routine parts of investigations under revenue laws that courts have sustained the distinction between the traditional crime versus the revenue offence, and used this distinction to conclude that the revenue officers are not &#8216;police officers&#8217;. The legislative mandate must be respected in full, and the majority opinion rightly does so.

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><strong>Conclusion: Confronting Two-Track Justice</strong></p>

The majority opinion in&nbsp;Radhika Agarwal&nbsp;re-emphasises that the power of warrantless arrests is drastic. It places this perspective at the heart of its reasoning to adopt conclusions which, in the eyes of the Court, aim to assist in the better regulation of how this drastic power is exercised. In pushing for&nbsp;better&nbsp;regulation the Court implicitly admits that the current scenario was suboptimal.&nbsp;

If the current scenario is indeed suboptimal, that calls for some pause to think and reflect. Throughout&nbsp;Radhika Agarwal&nbsp;we are reminded that the scheme for warrantless arrests under the Customs Act / GST Acts is different from the scheme governing such arrests for ordinary crimes made under the Criminal Procedure Code (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023). The threshold under the special laws for exercising this power is&nbsp;higher&nbsp;than the threshold under regular criminal law, and what&nbsp;Radhika Agarwal&nbsp;does is to tighten the bolts even further to ensure better regulation. At the same time, the total number of persons arrested under the special laws (and we can even add the PMLA here) is incomparably lesser than persons arrested everyday under the Cr.P.C. / BNSS for ordinary crime. Not only this, but the demographic of persons ordinarily being arrested under both sets of laws is also incomparable. Those arrested under the special laws are, usually, the &#8216;haves&#8217; with access to money and resources, whereas the ordinary criminal accused are the &#8216;have-nots&#8217; who are struggling to make ends meet.

There is, in practically every legal system, a two-track system of justice: one for the &#8216;haves&#8217;, and another for the &#8216;have-nots&#8217;. The law cannot completely rid the handicap that the have-nots suffer from because of their lack of resources and access to capital, but what a&nbsp;fair&nbsp;legal system can try and do is to make sure that it is designed to reduce the&nbsp;impact&nbsp;of this inequality. For instance, in context of warrantless arrests, a fair legal system would prescribe the&nbsp;same threshold&nbsp;for arrests under crimes traditionally linked only with the &#8216;haves&#8217; — such as tax fraud — and the usual crimes which traditionally mostly ensnare the &#8216;have nots&#8217; to ensure that the law is not compounding the ill-effects of the latent inequality. Instead, what we have, is the exact opposite in place. A&nbsp;two-track system of justice with an arrest regime having strong safeguards under laws that primarily concern the haves (made even more robust by court) and an arrest regime with weak safeguards when it comes to the &#8216;have nots&#8217; ensuring their liberty remains imperilled.&nbsp;

<p class="has-text-align-justify">This is a manifest injustice at the heart of this entire regime governing warrantless arrests. Rather than the ordinary law being dragged down to further improve upon the safeguards for warrantless arrests in special laws, one hopes that future benches of the Supreme Court and High Courts use the good work done by judgments such as&nbsp;<em>Radhika Agarwal&nbsp;</em>to raise the standard even for arrests under ordinary crimes. A start has, arguably, already been made in recent judgments on supplying the grounds of arrest. While the first judgments were indeed under a special law — the PMLA — the subsequent judgments affirmed this rule as applicable to&nbsp;<em>all&nbsp;</em>arrests. One hopes that a similar effect is felt in context of the arresting power itself, to tighten the bolts around the &#8216;reasonable suspicion&#8217; standard under the Cr.P.C. / BNSS as well. Such an outcome would ensure that the drastic power of warrantless arrests is better regulated in its application to lakhs of Indians, as opposed to the few hundreds&nbsp;who are alleged to be evading taxes.</p>
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<article id="post-13409" class="post-13409 post type-post status-publish format-standard hentry category-free-speech category-judges category-judicial-censorship category-judicial-emergencies category-the-judiciary tag-article-191a tag-freedom-of-speech tag-judges tag-judicial-censorship tag-the-judiciary-2 tag-the-supreme-court">
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		<h1 class="entry-title"><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/03/an-abuse-of-jurisdiction-the-supreme-courts-new-order-in-ranvir-allahbadias-case/" rel="bookmark">An Abuse of Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court&#8217;s New Order in Ranvir Allahbadia&#8217;s Case</a></h1>					<div class="entry-meta small-part">
				<span class="posted-on"><i class="fa fa-clock-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/03/an-abuse-of-jurisdiction-the-supreme-courts-new-order-in-ranvir-allahbadias-case/" rel="bookmark"><time class="entry-date published updated" datetime="2025-03-03T14:39:11+00:00">March 3, 2025</time></a></span><span class="byline"> <i class="fa fa-user space-left-right"></i><span class="author vcard"><a class="url fn n" href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/author/gautambhatia1988/">Gautam Bhatia</a></span></span><span class="comments-link"><i class="fa fa-comments-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/03/an-abuse-of-jurisdiction-the-supreme-courts-new-order-in-ranvir-allahbadias-case/#comments">8 Comments</a></span>			</div><!-- .entry-meta -->
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In a previous <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/what-the-court-missed-in-the-allahbadia-case-101740409333451.html">article</a> for The Hindustan Times, I had flagged a number of concerns with the way that the Supreme Court of India is handling the case of the YouTuber Ranvir Allahbadia, who is presently facing police prosecution for cracking a crass &#8211; but decidedly not criminal &#8211; joke on his channel. While Allahbadia had approached the Supreme Court with a prayer for clubbing the FIRs against him so that he would not be dragged from state to state having to defend himself in identical proceedings, the Court instead took the opportunity of hectoring him for his &#8220;immoral&#8221; content, banned him from airing further shows on YouTube, and called for greater &#8220;regulation&#8221; of online content. In the article, I had noted that the last point, in particular, suggested that instead of performing its constitutionally-mandated role as the guardian of fundamental rights, the Court was turning towards the opposite direction: that of pre-emptively inviting a regime of online censorship.

Today&#8217;s <a href="https://scourtapp.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2025/8375/8375_2025_3_27_59718_Order_03-Mar-2025.pdf">order</a> &#8211; the second in the proceedings &#8211; accentuates these concerns. On the one hand, the Court lifts the ban on Allahbadia&#8217;s YouTube activity, on the condition that the show &#8220;would maintain the desired standards of decency and morality so that viewers of any age group can watch it.&#8221; While it was unclear on what legal basis the Court had imposed its initial ban, it is even more unclear on what legal basis it now &#8220;conditionally&#8221; lifts this ban and forces Allahbadia to host only U/A content on his channel. Unfortunately, we do not have the privilege of reading and engaging with the Court&#8217;s legal reasoning on this point, since it provides us with none. There is little profit, then, in analysing this further, beyond what I have <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/what-the-court-missed-in-the-allahbadia-case-101740409333451.html">already written</a>.

This brings us, however, to the significant point of concern, which is the Court traversing further down the road of pre-emptively inviting online restriction of speech. In today&#8217;s order, the Court states that it is &#8220;inclined to expand the scope of the hearing&#8221;, and asks the State&#8217;s law officers to come up with &#8220;regulatory measures&#8221; to prevent airing of programs &#8220;offensive to well-known moral standards of society.&#8221; It then notes that such draft regulatory measures would be &#8220;brought in public domain to invite suggestions from all stakeholders before taking any legislative or judicial measures.&#8221;

In doing so, however, the Court seeks to alter its role from a judicial organ to a super-regulator of online speech. This is extremely problematic, because it essentially eviscerates the carefully-crafted constitutional scheme that is designed to protect individual rights from the State. Under the Constitution &#8211; as is clear from the design of Article 19, for example &#8211; in order to regulate or restrict the right to free speech, at the first instance, there must exist a law (that is, a Parliament-enacted statute). At the second instance, if this law is challenged, the judiciary exercises the power of judicial review over the law, during the course of which it examines whether the law complies with the Constitution. These two stages are clearly distinct, the bodies that they involve are clearly distinct, and the tasks that they perform are also clearly distinct. And this is for very good reason: the Constitution envisages a two-tiered structure of protection for fundamental rights, where first, the people&#8217;s representatives debate and enact a law, and then secondly, the Court applies constitutional standards to review this law.

The Court&#8217;s order, however, proposes a process that is entirely alien to the Constitution: a set of regulations that will be brought into force under this &#8220;expanded scope&#8221; of judicial proceedings (we still do not know what this &#8220;expanded scope&#8221; entails, because the Court has not told us). The independent role of Parliament in all this is unclear, but other than that, as we can see, it entirely blurs the distinct steps set out in the Constitution. And under this proposed process, the Court appears no longer to be acting like a judicial organ, but like a regulator, under whose supervision &#8220;stakeholders&#8221; will submit their &#8220;suggestions.&#8221;

Constitutional issues aside, it is easy to see how this will turn out: let&#8217;s say that the State brings in a set of regulations, to which the Court &#8211; continuing to act under this &#8220;expanded scope&#8221; &#8211; accords its approval. Now these regulations will have judicial sanction. This, in turn, means that citizens&#8217; ability to mount a constitutional challenge to these regulations will be blocked in perpetuity. What if I want to challenge these regulations before a High Court? Which High Court will admit a challenge to regulations that have been granted a seal of approval by the Supreme Court &#8211; regardless of the fact that the said seal of approval was granted in proceedings that were not constitutional challenges? And what sense would it make to challenge the regulations before the Supreme Court, given that a two-judge bench of that very Court has approved of them? Thus, not only does the Court blur functions, not only does it adopt a role that the Constitution does not envisage, not only does it act outside its jurisdiction, but in doing so, it effectively deprives citizens of any meaningful judicial remedy for whatever form these regulations will eventually take.

<p class="has-text-align-justify">On this blog, <strong><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2018/09/05/the-meesha-judgment-book-bans-and-the-supreme-courts-dangerous-grandstanding/"><mark style="background-color:rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)" class="has-inline-color has-vivid-cyan-blue-color">for the better part of a decade</mark></a></strong>, and in multiple contexts, we have argued that the Supreme Court&#8217;s continued propensity to act as a &#8220;super-regulator&#8221; or &#8220;super-censor&#8221; of speech is extra-constitutional, and beyond its jurisdiction. Today&#8217;s order continues that regrettable propensity. It is an order that manifestly lacks any legal or constitutional foundation, and constitutes an abuse of the Court&#8217;s jurisdiction. </p>
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<article id="post-13404" class="post-13404 post type-post status-publish format-standard hentry category-judicial-review category-of-parliamentary-process category-the-legislature tag-judicial-review-2 tag-legislative-process tag-legislature">
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		<h1 class="entry-title"><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/01/guest-post-judicial-review-of-parliamentary-process-in-dr-sunil-kumar-singh-v-bihar-legislative-council/" rel="bookmark">Guest Post: Judicial Review of Parliamentary Process in Dr Sunil Kumar Singh v. Bihar Legislative&nbsp;Council</a></h1>					<div class="entry-meta small-part">
				<span class="posted-on"><i class="fa fa-clock-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/01/guest-post-judicial-review-of-parliamentary-process-in-dr-sunil-kumar-singh-v-bihar-legislative-council/" rel="bookmark"><time class="entry-date published updated" datetime="2025-03-01T05:59:19+00:00">March 1, 2025</time></a></span><span class="byline"> <i class="fa fa-user space-left-right"></i><span class="author vcard"><a class="url fn n" href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/author/gautambhatia1988/">Gautam Bhatia</a></span></span><span class="comments-link"><i class="fa fa-comments-o space-left-right"></i><a href="https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2025/03/01/guest-post-judicial-review-of-parliamentary-process-in-dr-sunil-kumar-singh-v-bihar-legislative-council/#comments">1 Comment</a></span>			</div><!-- .entry-meta -->
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<p>[This is a guest post by <strong>Anmol Jain</strong>.]</p>

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<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>

In a recent Supreme Court <a href="https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/3583620242025-02-25-588453.pdf">judgment</a> dealing with the determination of the Court’s power to review the decision of the Bihar Legislative Council to expel one of its members—Dr Sunil Kumar Singh—from the membership of the House on account of calling Nitish Kumar paltu ram, among other things, the Court made certain important remarks on the interpretation Article 212 of the Indian Constitution. Beyond the facts of this case and the question of expulsion—and punishment in general—of the members of legislative assemblies, these observations are of critical relevance to other matters concerning the relationship of the legislature with the judiciary and the scope of judicial oversight of legislative actions. One such matter is the scope of judicial review of the Speaker’s decisions, including that of certifying a bill as a money bill. In the following paragraphs, I show how the interpretative framework adopted by the Court to creatively delimit the boundaries of Article 212 could help it answer the question about its power to review the decisions of the Speaker in the affirmative.

<p class="has-text-align-justify"><strong>The Existing Jurisprudence of the Court and Its Problems</strong></p>

<p class="has-text-align-justify">Before I move further, it is of benefit to reproduce Article 212 of the Constitution:</p>

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212. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature. (1) The validity of any proceedings in

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